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REMEMBERING MAINE: OFFSHORE
FEDERALISM IN THE UNITED-
STATES AND CANADA
GEORGE S. SWAN*
This article concerning the jurisdictional status of marginal
sea exploitation in the United States and Canada examines the
leading relevant judicial opinions in each of those countries. The
prospect for future jurisdictional controversies in Canada over the
marginal sea is explored, and the potential for a generally satisfac-
tory resolution of such controversies is briefly outlined through
discussion of marginal sea politico-legal strategies that have been
relied upon in the United States and Australia. Finally, it is
suggested that the danger of international clashes over exploitation
of the marginal sea areas may arguably make more persuasive a
vigorous federal government role in the marginal sea arena.
I. TIm UNITED STATES AND HER MARGINAL SEA
In United States v. Maine,I the most prominent of the Off-
shore Rights Cases2 decided on March 17, 1975, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the rights of the federal government in the
Atlantic seabed lying more than three geographical miles seaward
from the normal low-water mark and from the outer limits of the
inland waters on the coast. This federal right operates to the
exclusion of the thirteen Atlantic coast states concerned.
The Maine controversy arose during April, 1969, when the
United States requested leave to file a complaint against the thir-
teen" Atlantic coast states.4 The Court granted leave two months
* LL.M. candidate, University of Toronto Faculty of Law; B.A., Ohio
State University, J.D., University of Notre Dame; Member, Ohio Bar.
1. 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
2. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975); United States v. Florida,
420 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 529 (1975).
3. Those states include: Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. As the Supreme Court noted: "The State
of Connecticut was not made a defendant, apparently because that State borders
on Long Island Sound, which is considered inland waters, rather than open sea."
United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 517 n.1 (1975).
4. Id. at 517.
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later.5 The federal government's complaint alleged that the United
States was entitled to exercise sovereignty over both the seabed and
subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean more than three miles sea-
ward from the coast to the exclusion of each coastal state.6
Twelve of the original thirteen defendants answered by deny-
ig federal proprietary rights in the seabed beyond the three-mile
marginal sea.7 Each of these states claimed to itself as successor in
title to certain grantees of the British Crown (and in the instance of
New York, the Crown of Holland) exclusive dominion and control
over the contested seabed. The defendants delivered to the Court-
appointed special master voluminous documentary evidence sup-
porting their claims that they had acquired dominion over the
offshore seabed prior to adoption of the U.S. Constitution, and that
they had never relinquished dominion to the United States." Rhode
Island, North Carolina and Georgia each submitted additional
special defenses applicable only to themselves which were dis-
missed by the Court in a footnote.'
Before the special master, the United States relied upon the
Court's decisions in the Tidelands Cases, United States v. Califor-
nia,10 United States v. Louisiana," and United States v. Texas,'2
while the states asserted that the Tidelands Cases precedents should
be overruled as having been erroneously decided." The Supreme
Court, delivering judgment for the United States, determined that
California, Louisiana, and Texas controlled the issues before it in
Maine.'4  Discussion of Maine observed early and correctly that
5. United States v. Maine, 395 U.S. 955 (1969).
6. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 517 (1975).
7. The U.S.-Florida controversy was severed from the primary case. United
States v. Maine, 403 U.S. 949 (1971). Florida's argument against the federal
claim differed from that of the other east coast states. See United States v.
Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 517 n.3 (1975). Florida's contentions were adjudicated,
however, in a decision reached simultaneously with the Maine opinion. See
United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 515, 528 (1975).
8. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 518 (1975).
9. Id. n.4.
10. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
11. 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
12. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
13. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 517-18 (1975).
14. Id. at 518-19. Other nations have explicit marginal sea constitutional
provisions:
In the Nation is vested the direct ownership of all natural resources
of the continental shelf and the submarine shelf of the islands; of all
minerals or substances, which in veins, ledges, masses or ore pockets,
form deposits of a nature distinct from the components of the earth it-
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the "key precedent"' 5 thereto was California. Some examination
of that 1947 precedent is, therefore, appropriate.
The California suit was brought against that state by the U.S.
Attorney General and Solicitor General, who invoked the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.' 6 The complaint alleged that
the federal government enjoyed exclusive and paramount rights in
and powers over the Pacific seabed (including offshore petroleum
deposits) extending three nautical miles from the California coast
and outside of that state's inland waters.'
7
California answered in relevant part that it held ownership in
an offshore belt reaching three English miles' 8 for its coastal low-
water mark as being within her original state boundaries. Califor-
nia added that the thirteen original states had acquired from the
English Crown title to all lands within their boundaries under
navigable waters, including a three-mile belt of adjacent seas, and
that since California was admitted to statehood on a footing equal
with that of the original states, she at that time was vested with title
to all such lands. 9
self, such as the minerals from which industrial metals and metalloids
are extracted; deposits of precious stones, rock-salt and the deposits of
salt formed by sea water; products derived from the decomposition of
rocks, when subterranean works are required for their extraction; min-
eral or organic deposits of materials susceptible of utilization as fertiliz-
ers; solid mineral fuels; petroleum and all solid, liquid, and gaseous hy-
drocarbons; and the space above the national territory to the extent and
within the terms fixed by international law.
In the Nation is likewise vested the ownership of the waters of the
territorial seas, within the limits and terms fixed by international law;
CONSTrUTION OF MExIco art. 27, paras. 4, 5 (1917).
The islands, keys and reefs of the adjacent seas which belong to the
national territory, the continental shelf, the submarine shelf of the is-
lands, keys and reefs, the inland marine waters, and the space above the
national territory shall depend directly on the Government of the Fed-
eration, with the exception of those islands over which the States have
up to the present exercised jurisdiction.
Id. art. 48.
15. Young, Supreme Court Report: Federal Government Owns Atlantic
Shore Seabed, 61 A.B.A.J. 625, 628 (1975).
16. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 22 (1947).
17. Id. at 22-23.
18. The federal complaint encompassed a region extending three nautical
miles from shore; California alleged its boundary reached three English miles. Be-
cause one nautical mile equals 1.15 English miles, a difference arose of .45 of
an English mile between the boundary of the federal claim and that of the state
claim. Id. at 23 n.1. California pointed out that its original (1849) constitution
included the three English mile claim prior to admission to the Union. Id. at
19. ld. at 23.
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The United States contended that the thirteen original colo-
nies did not own the marginal belt and that the federal government
had never bestowed any rights in the contested area upon the
states, but rather, had retained them incident to national sovereign-
ty.20 In adjudicating this controversy the Court found evidence
unnecessary; the legal issues were resolved following extensive legal
analysis by counsel for both parties.21
The Court denied that the thirteen original colonies separately
acquired ownership to either the three-mile belt or its subsoil, even
if by their revolution they had acquired elements of the sovereignty
of the English Crown. 22  The Court found no substantial histor-
ical support for the idea that the colonists desired or claimed any
right to isolate the seabed for private ownership and use in extrac-
tion of wealth.23 Only after American nationhood did U.S. states-
men require dominion over a definite marginal zone to protect
neutrality. 24 By 1947, it was settled that the national political
agencies claimed and exercised wide dominion and control over the
three-mile marginal belt. This assertion of national dominion was
found to be binding on the Court. 5
Of major significance to the 1975 Maine holding was the
attention paid in California to the federal defense/foreign relations
capacity. As the Court in California bluntly declared: "[n]ot only
has acquisition, as it were, of the three-mile belt been accomplished
by the National Government, but protection and control of it has
been and is a function of national external sovereignty.
' '26
So critical did the Supreme Court find the national external
sovereignty factor that it felt its assessment bore elaboration:
The three-mile rule is but a recognition of the necessity that
a government next to the sea must be able to protect itself
from dangers incident to its location. It must have powers
20. id. at 3 1.
21. The Court stated:
The legal issues thus raised have been exhaustively presented by coun-
sel for the parties, both by brief and oral argument. Neither has sug-
gested any necessity for the introduction of evidence, and we perceive no
such necessity at this stage of the case.
Id. at 24. The Court also alluded to the "able briefs" supplying a "wealth of ma-
terial." Id. at 31.
22. Id. at 31.
23. Id. at 32-33.
24. Id. at 33.
25. Id. at 33-34.
26. id. at 34.
1976
4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1976], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol6/iss2/4
CALIFORNIA WEsTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOuRNAL
of dominion and regulation in the interest of its revenues, its
health, and the security of its people from wars waged on or
too near its coasts. And insofar as the nation asserts its rights
under international law, whatever of value may be discovered
in the seas next to its shores and within its protective belt,
will most naturally be appropriated for its use. But whatever
any nation does in the open sea, which detracts from its com-
mon usefulness to nations, or which another nation may
charge detracts from it, is a question for consideration among
nations as such, and not their separate governmental units.
What this Government does, or even what the states do, any-
where in the ocean, is a subject upon which the nation may
enter into and assume treaty or similar international obliga-
tions.2 7
To this the Court added an observation which yet may prove
prophetic in the petroleum-thirsty world of the late 1970's: 2 "The
very oil about which the state and nation here contend might well
become the subject of international dispute and settlement. 29
The Court concluded that a state of the United States is not
equipped within the American constitutional framework with ei-
ther the authority or the facilities to exercise the duties concomitant
with the dominion sought by California.3 ° Even a state's authori-
zation to exercise a local police power in the portion of the margin-
al belt within its declared boundaries does not detract from the
paramount federal rights in and power over that area.3 ' The
ocean, even within the three-mile coastal belt, is of vital national
consequence to the national imperatives to live peacefully in the
family of nations and engage in international commerce. The
Court realized that inasmuch as peace and world commerce are
27. Id. at 35 (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 331-32 (1937)).
28. "The question of who owned the bed of the sea only became of great
potential importance at the beginning of this century when oil was discovered
there." Id. at 38.
29. Id. at 35. But appreciatively apprehend the entirely reasonable caveat
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
The fact that these oil deposits in the open sea may be vital to the na-
tional security, and important elements in the conduct of our foreign af-
fairs, is no more relevant than is the existence of uranium deposits,
wherever they may be, in determining questions of trespass to the land
of which they form a part. This is not a situation where an exercise of
national power is actively and presently interfered with.
Id. at 44 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 35-36.
31. Id. at 36.
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paramount responsibilities of the United States, not of the Ameri-
can states, wars, if they come, must be waged by the nation.
2
Within the body of the Maine opinion the Court cited only
two cases in addition to California.88 These were the aforemen-
tioned Tidelands Cases opinions in the Texas and the 1950 Louis-
iana cases.
The 1950 Louisiana opinion adjudicated a controversy origi-
nally brought before the Supreme Court by the U.S. Attorney
General and Solicitor General against Louisiana,84 and arising out
of a 1938 Louisiana statute8" which proclaimed that state's south-
ern boundary to be twenty-seven marine miles from the shoreline.
The complaint alleged that the United States possessed para-
mount rights in, and full dominion over the Gulf of Mexico seabed
lying up to twenty-seven marine miles off the Louisiana coast. " It
further alleged that Louisiana, in claiming property rights adverse
to the United States in the disputed seabed, had made leases for the
extraction of gas and petroleum therefrom.
37
Louisiana's answer conceded that the federal government en-
joyed paramount rights in and dominion over the contested stretch
of Gulf seabed to the extent of all governmental powers existing
under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the U.S. Yet Louis-
iana insisted that, inasmuch as Congress had adopted no law
proclaiming federal authority to authorize the exploitation of the
Gulf seabed, no conflicting claims of governmental power existed.
She therefore averred that there actually was no justiciable contro-
versy between the parties. 88
The Supreme Court nevertheless decided the question under-
lying the case. It explicitly stated that California was the control-
ling precedent, and held for the United States.39  The Court
perceived no material difference in the pre- and post-admission
history of Louisiana to strengthen her claim over that of Califor-
nia.40 The Court felt the actual question at issue was not the
32. Id. at 35 (Citing Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1875)).
33. The Maine opinion does cite further non-Maine cases in a footnote. See
United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 528 n.9 (1975).
34. United States v. Loiusiana, 339 U.S. 699, 700 (1950).
35. 6 Dart, La. Gen. Stats. §§ 9311.1-9311.4 (1939).
36. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 701 (1950).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 702.
39. Id. at 704.
40. Id. at 705.
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power of a state to use the seabed or to regulate its use in the
absence of a contrary federal policy, but the power of a state to
deny the paramount authority which the United States sought to
assert.4'
Federal authority over the marginal seabed, as the Court
reiterated in the 1950 Louisiana opinion, hinges on the federal
defense/foreign relations capacity:
The marginal sea is a national, not a state concern. National
interests, national responsibilities, national concerns are in-
volved. The problems of commerce, national defense, rela-
tions with other powers, war and peace focus there. National
rights must therefore be paramount in that area.4 2
Nor could the difference in offshore area claimed by Louisiana
from that claimed by California salvage a more favorable judgment
for the Gulf Coast state. As the Court inexorably continued:
If, as we held in California's case, the three-mile belt is in
the domain of the Nation rather than that of the separate
States, it follows a fortiori that the ocean beyond that limit
also is. The ocean seaward of the marginal belt is perhaps
even more directly related to the national defense, the con-
duct of foreign affairs, and world commerce than is the mar-
ginal sea. Certainly it is not less so. So far as the issues
presented here are concerned, Louisiana's enlargement of her
boundary emphasizes the strength of the claim of the 'United
States to this part of the ocean and the resources of the soil
under that area, including oil.
43
This statement makes clear the import attached by the Court to
world commerce and foreign affairs.
The Texas case was a companion to the 1950 Louisiana
opinion; the federal government's complaint was materially identi-
cal to that filed against Louisiana.44 In 1941, Texas had attempt-
ed to extend her border to a line in the Gulf twenty-four marine
miles beyond the three-mile limit, and in 1947, she had attempted
to move her border to the outer edge of the continental shelf.4 The
federal government claimed paramount rights in and dominion
41. Id. at 704.
42. Id. The Court continued immediately thereafter: "That is the rationale
of United States v. California." Id.
43. Id. at 705-06.
44. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 709 (1950).
45. Id. at 720.
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over this seabed to the outer edge of the continental shelf .4 As an
affirmative defense, Texas asserted that as an independent nation,
the Republic of Texas had exclusive control and jurisdiction over
the Gulf seabed within three marine leagues from shore. Texas
futher contended that this claim had been acquiesced in by the
United States and other major nations, and that Texas had retained
her exclusive jurisdiction and control following statehood.
47
The Supreme Court assumed that as an independent republic,
Texas indeed had enjoyed ownership of and full sovereignty over
the marginal sea and seabed.48  But the offshore seabed authority
which Texas might then have exercised was relinquished, the Court
held, upon admission to the Union.4 9 The rationale here, again,
was the post-admission federal defense/foreign relations capacity:
The United States then took her [Texas'] place as respects
foreign commerce, the waging of war, the making of treaties,
defense of the shores, and the like. In external affairs the
United States became the sole and exclusive spokesman for
the Nation. We hold that as an incident to the transfer of
that sovereignty any claim that Texas may have had to the
marginal sea was relinquished to the United States.50
Moreover, the Court stated that: "[i]f the property, whatever it
may be, lies seaward of low-water mark its use, disposition, man-
agement, and control involve national interests and national re-
sponsibilities. That is the source of national rights in it."51
The Supreme Court, in assuming that the Republic of Texas
enjoyed ownership of, and full sovereignty over the marginal sea
and seabed, made as favorable an assumption as is likely to be
made on behalf of other jurisdictions under the American flag,
46. Id. at 709.
47. Id. at 711.
48. Id. at 717.
49. Id. at 718.
50. Id. at 718. The Court continued: "We stated the reasons for this in
United States v. California . . . ." Id.
51. Id. at 719. The Court continued: "Such is the rationale of the Cali-
fornia decision, which we have applied to Louisiana's case." Id. But see the
completely plausible dissent of Mr. Justice Reed, in which Mr. Justice Minton
joined:
The needs of defense and foreign affairs alone cannot transfer owner-
ship of an ocean bed from a state to the Federal Government any more
than they could transfer iron ore under uplands from state to federal
ownership. National responsibility is no greater in respect to the mar-
ginal sea than it is toward every other particle of American territory.
Id. at 723 (Reed, J., dissenting).
1976
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such as Puerto Rico. Under the rule in Texas, it is implausible
that Puerto Rico could prevail with a similar offshore claim. The
relinquishment of claims on the Texas marginal sea was incidental
to the transfer of her sovereignty to the United States. The Court
specified that the transfer saw the U.S. take Texas' place with
respect to foreign commerce, the waging of war, and defense of the
shores. It is exactly as to such federal defense/foreign relations
capacities that the United States has long since taken the place of
Spain for Puerto Rico.
II. CANADA AND HER MARGINAL SEA
The leading Canadian opinion concerning the offshore
seabed is Re: Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia." The
questions disputed therein were referred to the Supreme Court of
Canada by the Governor-in-Council.53 That Court's responses to
the questions so referred are not binding, even upon the Governor-
in-Council,54 the Court's function in this regard being similar to
the advisory opinion functions of the International Court of Jus-
tice.5 5 This exercise of the Canadian Supreme Court contrasts with
the policy of the U.S. Supreme Court.50
The Governor-in-Council first inquired as to the seabed and
subsoil seaward from the low-water mark on the British Columbia
coast, excluding inland water areas and extending to the outer limit
of the Canadian territorial sea. He asked: (a) whether such lands
were the property of Canada or British Columbia; (b) whether
Canada or British Columbia had the right to explore and exploit
52. [1967] Can. S. Ct. 792. Prior to this case there had been no authori-
tative adjudication of the limits of territorial jurisdiction or ownership in a province
relative to the Dominion concerning the seabeds of offshore waters. A. ABEL,
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 530 (4th ed. 1973).
53. Re: Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] Can. S. Ct.
792, 796.
54. Head, The Canadian Offshore Minerals Reference, 18 U. TORONTO L.J.
131 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Head]. But see G. LAFoREST, NATIONAL RE-
SOURCES AND PUBLIC PROPERTY UNDER THE CANADIAN CONSTrrUTmON 100 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as LAFoREST]:
The reference Re: Offshore Minerals Rights of British Columbia, of
course, judicially settles the competing claims of the Dominion and Brit-
ish Columbia towards the territorial waters adjacent to the province.
In the British Columbia case, Mr. LaForest represented the Attorney General of
New Brunswick. Re: Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia. [1967]
Can. S. Ct. 792, 795.
55. See Head, note 54 supra.
56. Id. at 132.
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such lands; and, (c) whether Canada or British Columbia had
legislative jurisdiction relative to them (these are styled the "terri-
torial sea" questions).5'7 He also asked, relative to the seabed and
subsoil resources beyond the Canadian territorial sea, as between
Canada and British Columbia: (a) has Canada or British Colum-
bia the right to exploit said resources? and, (b) has Canada or
British Columbia legislative jurisdiction relative to said resources?
(these are styled the "continental shelf" questions).58
The Attorney General of Canada proposed that all of these
questions should be answered "Canada." British Columbia argued
that it possessed sole legislative jurisdiction and exclusive proprie-
tary rights in the disputed areas and enjoyed sole rights to the
exploitation thereof. All of the Canadian provinces except
Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta were represented
on the reference, and argument was heard from their counsel; all
supported British Columbia. The entry into the case by these
provinces was appropriate, since eight of the ten Canadian prov-
inces have saltwater frontage.
59
The Court prefaced its discussion of the territorial sea and
continental shelf questions with an historical outline of the status of
British Columbia since before 1849.60 Its historical survey con-
cluded that: (1) all pre-Confederation unalienated lands (including
minerals) in British Columbia had belonged to the Crown in right
of the colony of British Columbia, and, (2) such lands even after
union with Canada remained vested in the Crown in right of the
Province of British Columbia. 1 Yet the Court conceded this left
untouched the question of whether the territorial sea was within the
boundaries of British Columbia at time of Confederation. British
Columbia posited that the Province of British Columbia, at the
time of her entry into the Union in 1871, included the territorial
sea. Canada contrariwise asserted that in 1871, land below the
low-water mark was regarded as outside the realm at common law,
and that following union it did not become part of the province.6
2
57. Re: Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] Can. S. Ct.
792, 796.
58. Id.
59. Head supra note 54 at 132. Professor Head added: "Only Alberta and
Saskatchewan are landlocked." Id.
60. Re: Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] Can. S. Ct.
792, 797-800.
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The Court confessed that the British North America Act of
186763 was of no utility in disposing of the British Columbia
problem. 4 While to be sure the British North America Act of
1871 provides for the realignment of provincial boundaries, 5 the
court apprehended that there has never been any alteration of the
borders of British Columbia under that Act, and that no other
alteration method exists.66 The Court, therefore, concluded that
British Columbia bore the burden of demonstrating that in 1871
the territorial sea in fact was a part of British Columbia."
The Supreme Court found of great significance,6 in ascertain-
ing the claim of British Columbia in 1871 to the territorial sea, the
decision in Regina v. Keyn, 69 rendered by the English Court of
Crown Cases in 1876. In Keyn, the commander of a foreign ship
was indicted before the Central Criminal Court for manslaughter
stemming from the loss of life on a British ship sunk by the
commander's ship within three miles of Dover. The accused was a
German national whose ship was on a voyage other than to Eng-
land; his ship at the time of collision was only passing through
English territorial waters. 70  A plea of jurisdiction was set up by
the accused, who said that because the offense was committed
outside the United Kingdom aboard a foreign ship, by a foreigner,
the offense was not within the English Criminal Court's jurisdic-
tion.
7 1
The question whether the country embraced the territorial sea
was directly at issue in Keyn. The Canadian Supreme Court in
discussing the case recognized that the Keyn offense would have
been within the jurisdiction of the English Criminal Courts had the
63. British North America Act of 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c.3.
64. Re: Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] Can. S. Ct.
792, 801.
65. See British North America Act of 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., 28 § 2.
66. Re: Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] Can. S. Ct.
792, 801.
67. Id.
68. The Court decided that the Keyn case correctly stated the law." LA.
FOREST, supra note 54, at 98.
69. 2 Ex. D. 63 (1876).
70. Re: Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] Can. S. Ct.
792, 803. The caution rightly has been put forth: "R. v. Keyn is a complicated
case; without some knowledge of the facts it is a hopeless labyrinth." Head,
supra note 54, at 140.
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incident occurred within an English county.72 The Court of
Crown Cases Reserved held that English territory ended at low-
water mark, and, therefore, that no jurisdiction obtained in the
English Criminal Courts. The Court of Crown Cases Reserved
added that the Keyn controversy also failed to fall within the
historical jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral, since the Admi-
ral's jurisdiction, which begins at low-water mark, did not extend
to foreign nationals on foreign ships.
74
Due to the outcome in Keyn, the British Parliment enacted
the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878, T7 which declared
that every offense committed on the open sea within a single
marine league of the coast of any part of Her Majesty's Dominions
was encompassed within the jurisdiction of the Admiral.76  The
Supreme Court of Canada noted that the Act simply dealt with
what then was perceived to be a gap in the Admiral's jurisdiction.
It did not enlarge the English realm and never purported to relate
to the juridical nature of British territorial waters of their seabeds:
"We have to take it, therefore, that even after the enactment of the
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act the majority opinion in Reg. v.
Keyn that the territory of England ends at low-water mark was
undisturbed.
77
The Supreme Court was quite specific in articulating its rea-
son for devoting such attention to the history revolving about the
Keyn issue:
The application of the Act of 1878 is relevant to the problem
under consideration here. The Admiral's jurisdiction was
made to extend to all offences committed on the open sea
within one marine league of the coast of any part of Her
Majesty's Dominions. The term "offence" was defined in the
Act as "any act of such a nature that it would, if committed
within the body of an English county, be punishable on indict-
ment according to the law of England at the time being in
force." What would have happened in 1879 if an offence
had been committed within one marine league of the coast
of British Columbia? Had the case come up in a British
72. Id. at 804.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878, 41 & 42 Vict., c. 73.
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Columbia court, the applicable law would not have been the
criminal law of Canada, but the law of England for the time
being in force. If the territory of British Columbia had ex-
tended one marine league from low-water mark, the offence
would have occurred within Canada and Canadian criminal
law ought to have been applicable, but by the express terms
of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act it was the law of
England that applied. The legislation is inconsistent with any
theory that in 1878 the Province of British Columbia pos-
sessed as part of its territory the solum of the territorial sea.
78
The Court was explicit in attaching great weight to the historical
grounding of the legal claims made in 1967 by British Columbia.79
Given its reliance on the teaching of Keyn, it is little wonder
that the Supreme Court wrote that it was of the opinion that the
territorial sea lay outside the limits of the Colony of British Colum-
bia in 1871 and did not become part of British Columbia following
union with Canada. It was also of the opinion that British Colum-
bia did not acquire jurisdiction over the territorial sea following
union with Canada."0 But disposition of the British Columbia
territorial sea claim was not sufficient to establish a case for the
federal governments ' because nothing in the British North Ameri-
ca Act transfers to the federal government the submarine re-
sources of the territorial sea.
82
The Supreme Court recognized that Canada today is in her
own right a sovereign state,8" as section 3 of the Statute of West-
minster clearly empowers the Dominion Parliament to impose laws
having extra-territorial operation.84 At this point in its discussion
of conflicting federal-provincial territorial sea claims, the Canadian
78. Id.
79. There was no historical record evidencing a different rule for Bri-
tish Columbia, so that the colony ended at low-water mark at the date
of union, and nothing had been done since union to change the situation.
Accordingly, the territorial sea and its underlying resources did not be-
long to British Columbia.
LAFoREST, supra note 54, at 98.
80. Re: Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] Can. S. Ct.
792, 814.
81. LAFOREsT, supra note 54, at 98.
82. Id.
83. The Court stated:
There can be no doubt now that Canada has become a sovereign state.
Its sovereignty was acquired in the period between its separate signature
of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the Statute of Westminster, 1931,
22 Geo. V., c. 4.
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Supreme Court's opinion begins to resemble those opinions of the
U.S. Supreme Court on the offshore seabed by alluding to the role
of the federal government as international actor.
The Canadian Supreme Court's opinion recognizes that the
Dominion has full constitutional capacity to assume new territories
and new jurisdictional rights as may be available under internation-
al law. The Court understands "that Canada is recognized in
international law as having sovereignty over a territorial sea three
nautical miles wide. It is part of the territory of Canada.""5
The Supreme Court answered the three territorial sea ques-
tions in favor of Canada. It noted:
The mineral resources of the lands underlying the terri-
torial sea are of concern to Canada as a whole and go beyond
local or provincial concern or interests.
Moreover, the rights in the territorial sea arise by inter-
national law and depend upon recognition by other sovereign
states. Legislative jurisdiction in relation to the lands in
question belongs to Canada which is a sovereign state recog-
nized by international law and thus able to enter into arrange-
ments with other states respecting the rights in the territorial
sea.86
But did these answers leave unresolved the Continental Shelf ques-
tions?
The premises of British Columbia's claim to the continental
shelf were effectively negated by the Supreme Court's conclusion
that she had no right to the territorial sea.8 7 In so doing, the Court
looked to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf88
which defines those rights that may be exercised toward exploring
and exploiting the continental shelf's natural resources by a coastal
state.8 ' That Convention expresses the current state of interna-
85. Id.
86. id. at 817. "The Court's opinion can be seen as a clear pronouncement
on the unique ability of Canada to acquire rights available under international
law." Note, Legal Issues of the Offshore Mineral Rights Dispute in Canada, 14
MCGILL L.J. 475, 492 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Legal Issues].
87. "The foundation for the argument was completely removed when the Su-
preme Court held that the province of British Columbia ended at low-water
mark." LAFOREST, supra note 54, at 106.
88. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958,
[1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578.
89. Re: Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] Can. S. Ct.
792, 819.
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tional law on the matter,90 permitting a coastal state to exploit its
offshore submarine area to a depth of 200 meters or beyond, where
the water depth remains conducive to exploiting natural re-
sources.9 The Court held:
There are two reasons why British Columbia lacks the right to
explore and exploit and lacks legislative jurisdiction:
(1) The continental shelf is outside the boundaries of Brit-
ish Columbia, and
(2) Canada is the sovereign state which will be recognized
by international law as having the right stated in the
Convention of 1958, and it is Canada, not the Province
of British Columbia, that will have to answer the claims
of other members of the international community for
breach of the obligations and responsibilities imposed
by the Convention.
92
Only to the continental shelf questions did the Court attach great
weight to the nature of the nation-state as international actor. Even
here, the decision was premised on the territorial sea answers,
which on their face had been premised not upon policy, but legal
history.
Scholarly analysis of the Canadian Reference has pointed out
that the policy considerations weighed so seriously in the American
Tidelands Cases were also applicable in the Canadian dispute:93
"At stake was the federal government's sovereign prerogative to
conduct foreign policy, and the capacity of the provinces unilateral-
ly to extend their boundaries seaward."94 Yet the Supreme Court
of Canada made no statement even faintly resembling the strong
pro-federal language of the United States Supreme Court in Cali-
fornia, Texas and the 1950 Louisiana opinion, looking to the
federal defense/foreign relations capacity. 5 Another commen-
tator goes so far as to say:
The Federal argument for jurisdiction over offshore resources
was so firmly based on the contention that the lands in ques-
90. id. at 820.
91. LAFosmr, supra note 54, at 105.
92. Re: Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] Can. S. Ct.
792, 821. "In the face of this judgment it would seem difficult for any province
to mount a successful historical argument in favour of ownership of the resources
of the continental shelf." IAFoRsT, supra note 54, at 106.
93. Head, supra note 54, at 150.
94. Id. at 156-57.
95. Id. at 150.
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tion were beyond the boundaries of British Columbia that it
"bypassed" seeking a pronouncement on an anomalous aspect
of the constitution, viz; the hindrance to Canada's ability to
participate fully in the international community caused .by a
judicial pronouncement depriving it, in the name of provincial
rights, of the legislative ability to implement treaties.9 6
III. CANADA'S MARGINAL SEA DISPUTE
It is extremely probable that further litigation of the state-
federal/provincial-federal seabed issue will occur in either or both
the United States and Canada. There is certainly no necessary
reason at law for further litigation to fail to transpire. As the U.S.
Supreme Court admitted in its Maine opinion: "[o]f course, the
defendant States were not parties to United States v. California or
to the [other earlier] relevant decisions and they are not precluded
by res judicata from litigating the issues decided by those cases."9 7
And as has been seen, the Canadian Reference determination, being
only an advisory opinion, strictly speaking is not binding even on
British Columbia."'
Whether provincial-federal disputes regarding the offshore
seabed will be settled before the Canadian Supreme Court or
elsewhere remains moot. Former Canadian Prime Minister, Les-
ter B. Pearson, had promised in 1965 that if the Supreme Court
found for the federal government, then Ottawa would negotiate
"equitable arrangements"9 with the coastal provinces. In Cana-
da, in contrast to the United States, federal-provincial conflicts are
settled only rarely by reference to the Supreme Court. Instead the
controversies are usually resolved via negotiation.10 0 Professor
Edwin R. Black reportedly has suggested that the American state
governments prefer impartial judicial outcomes to bargaining be-
tween political unequals as a consequence of being relatively much
weaker than their provincial counterparts vis-et-vis the federal gov-
96. Legal Issues, supra note 86, at 487.
97. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 5i5, 527 (1975).
98. Logan, Parting the Waters-Canadian Style, GEoGRAPHICAL APPROACHES
TO CANADIAN PROBLEMS 199 (R. Gentilcore, ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Lo-
gan]. "First, because it was a reference, the opinion of the Court was advisory
only, and therefore is not a precedent binding in the technical sense." Beau-
champ, Crommelin & Thompson, Jurisdictional Problems in Canada's Offshore,
11 ALBERTA L. REV. 341, 450 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Beauchamp].
99. Logan, supra note 98, at 199.
100. Id. at 207 n.7.
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emiment. Additionally, the typical Canadian politician sees his
constitution as so outdated as to be irrelevant to contemporary
problem-solving. 1' 1
In fact, the provinces initially sought a political outcome to
the offshore seabed controversy which has raged since the early
1960's. 112 For a period, the federal government seemed almost in
agreement that negotiation, not litigation, was its best course.
10 3
Only upon consultation with its legal advisors did the Ottawa
Cabinet resolve that a persuasive legal test must precede political
negotiations,' 0 and it was for the sake of simplicity that the
reference dealt only with British Columbia.1
0 5
In 1967, following the Canadian Offshore Minerals Refer-
ence, the Prime Minister intimated in the House of Commons that
a political settlement was being considered. 0 6 In 1968, the feder-
al government moved from the legal arena to the political by
publishing proposals to solve the offshore rights conflict.
0 7
Ottawa thereby proposed a series of "mineral resource admin-
istration lines" off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in Hudson
Bay, Hudson Strait and James Bay (but not in the Arctic).' 0 8  To
the landward side of these lines, the provinces would have total
control over seabed resources and all revenues derived therefrom;
on the seaward side, the federal government would administer the
resources, but would equally divide the resulting income with the
provinces. The provincial portion of the monies from the federally
controlled shelf area would be paid into a national pool for distri-
bution among the provinces.0 9
101. Id.
102. Head, supra note 54, at 132.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 132-33.
105. Id. at 133. As Professor Head further comments:
The governments of several of these provinces expressed the wish that
the conflicting federal-provincial claims be dealt with by negotiation at
a conference called for that purpose. The federal government, on the
other hand, demurred, saying that negotiations could not properly pro-
ceed until the legal position of the parties had been made clear.
Head, The Legal Clamor Over Canadian Offshore Minerals, 5 ALBERTA L. REv.
312, 314 (1967) [hereinafter cited as The Legal Clamor].
106. Head, supra note 54, at 156.
107. Logan, supra note 98, at 201-03.
108. Id. at 203.
109. Id. Logan understandably added: "The federal proposals appear gener-
ous indeed, particularly considering the Supreme Court's finding that offshore
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The federal position provoked mixed provincial responses.
Those of the governments of British Columbia and Newfoundland
were positive. Ontario's Premier at that time, John Robarts, ad-
mitted that Ontario's boundary in James Bay and Hudson Bay is
the low-water mark, but insisted that because these are internal
Canadian bodies of water, their offshore mineral resources accrue
to the adjacent provinces of Ontario, Manitoba and Quebec.""
However, only the federal government can alter provincial bound-
aries, and Ottawa declined to do so."1
Quebec, meanwhile, rigidly stood by her constitutional argu-
ment that the federal government had no role at all in offshore
mineral resources management."" This argument is consistent
with her refusal to appear before the Supreme Court in the adviso-
ry opinion, her premier stating that Quebec had ceased to accept
the Canadian Supreme Court as a constitutional interpreter. 1 3
Quebec has long retained the position that it owned its offshore
areas and that it should ignore both the advisory opinion and the
federal negotiation offer." 4
The stand early taken by Quebec was resolutely joined in late
September, 1975, by Newfoundland. By that time, Newfoundland
Premier Frank Moores bluntly proclaimed:
We have oil, that's been proved. Every time they stick a well
in the ground, it produces. The problem is getting control
of it. It's our oil, but Ottawa wants it. If the Supreme Court
decides against us, we will not accept the decision. We will
secede from the Confederation, if necessary, and come back
in on our own terms. We don't need a lot of offshore oil
110. Id. at 205. 'To support its case, Ontario points out that its provincial
boundaries coincide with Canada's international border in the Great Lakes
(which, however, are nontidal)." Id.
111. Id. These three provinces attempted without success to tentatively
agree on partition of the sea floor should Ottawa renounce jurisdiction.
112. Id.
113. Head, supra note 54, at 133-34.
114. Beauchamp, supra note 98, at 457. Perhaps the Quebec administration
despaired at ever obtaining a more favorable later opinion: "If the historical-
legalism of the decision renders the Court 'conservative' or 'restrained' by some
standards, the same cannot be said in terms of its having handed down a rare
unanimous and joint opinion. This is noteworthy when one realizes that between
1949 and 1960 the thirty-seven constitutional cases decided by the Court con-
tained an average of four (dissenting or concurring) individual opinions. Thus,
the 'strength' of the pro-federal opinion cannot be denied." Legal Issues, supra
note 86, at 484-88 (footnotes omitted).
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and gas to satisfy the needs of our small population, but we
want the first shot at what we have.115
Should the provinces accept the principle of mineral resource
lines, it has been anticipated that powerful attempts could be made
to push the lines further offshore so as to maximize the amount of
purely provincial revenues. But the federal lines as originally
designed already have circumvented several political difficulties." 6
There are actually two components to provincial boundaries
coterminous with the extent of Canadian internal waters: the clos-
ing lines drawn across certain harbors and bays, and the low-water
lines that parallel the coast. Canada's Prime Minister, Pierre E.
Trudeau, has pointed out the problems in ascertaining what would
have been deemed a harbor or bay at the time each province
entered Confederation; definitive resolution of these questions
would be excessively time-consuming. Low-water lines constantly
shift, and because of differing tidal regimes about Canada and the
planet, no "low-water mark" definition is universally accepted.
Ottawa surely hoped to skirt the precise definition of provincial
limits by drawing mineral resource administration lines entirely
within the federal sovereignty locations." 7
It was also anticipated that the provinces might call for a
larger percentage of the revenues generated from federally con-
trolled areas. 8 Moreover, the federal government, as long ago as
1968, pointed out that the mode of division of the federally gener-
ated monies would be primarily a provincial problem. It was not
at once clear whether provincial shares would be equal or whether
they would relate to need, population, or length of coastline. It
was not even clear whether the landlocked provinces of Saskatche-
wan and Alberta would receive a share."'
IV. ANALOGOUS FEDERAL SETTLEMENTS
Some equitable resolution of this problem should be feasible
in Canada. Following the United States Supreme Court decisions
115. Moores, If Necessary We Will Secede, TIME CANADA, Sept. 29, 1975, at
13. For a recent discussion in provincial secession in Canada, see Matas, Can
Quebec Separate?, 21 McGILL L.J. 387 (1975).
116. Logan, supra note 98, at 205.
117. Id.
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in the Tidelands Cases, 2 ' the U.S. Congress enacted the 1953
Submerged Lands Act. 2 ' In a step which was politically expedi-
ent for the federal government, 122 the Act transferred to the coastal
states ownership of the seabed seaward to the territorial limits.'
23
The Act released states from liability to account for any prior
income received from state leases that had been granted in the
marginal sea.'2 4
The 1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act declared the
jurisdiction of the U.S. over the seabed and subsoil in the areas
seaward of the territorial limits. 1 25  This proclamation has resulted
in an awkward situation. The mutual offshore boundary be-
tween the U.S. and each coastal state is ambulatory because it is
altered through accretion, erosion, or artificial changes, 126 and the
Supreme Court holds that change of governmental seabed claims
via boundary line movement results automatically in the extinction
of the lease in the transferred area.
127
120. "These cases have come to be described, erroneously, as the 'tidelands'
controversy." The Legal Clamor, supra note 105, at 324.
It is of some interest, although certainly of minor importance, that the
term 'tidelands' was erroneously given to the disputed submerged lands
at the very commencement of the controversy. The term is of course
a misnomer as applied to the offshore lands, as technically it is only that
narrow strip of shore line over which the tide ebbs and flows. Through
the years, however, everyone has firmly accepted the name of the off-
shore area as being the tidelands, and it has proven to be a convenient
method of describing the disputed properties.
A. Lewis, A Capusule History and the Present Status of the Tidelands Contro-
versy, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES LAw. 620 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Lewis].
121. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
122. Note, 2 OTrAWA L REV. 212, 218 (1967).
There followed a bitter battle in Congress over the Supreme Court rul-
ings. The ultimate result was the adoption by Congress of the Sub-
merged Lands Act of 1953 which was said by its sponsors to 'restore' to
the coastal states the offshore lands that were considered to be theirs
prior to the Court's [Tidelands Cases] ruling.
Lewis, supra note 120, at 621. The Submerged Lands Act has been held constitu-
tional by the Supreme Court. See Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
123. The Legal Clamor, supra note 105, at 313. The Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1970) applied to the areas in question the
laws of the coastal states to the extent they are consistent with federal laws and
are applicable. See Note, supra note 122, at 218 n.15. See also Beauchamp,
supra note 98, at 465-66.
124. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 523-24 (1975).
125. The Legal Clamor, supra note 105, at 313 n.10. See Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
126. Lewis, supra note 120, at 630.
127. Id.; Justice Black stated:
mhe Court admits that if the United States wins, the boundary
between state and federal lands will be an ambulatory one, with oil leases
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In Australia, a rather complex framework was constructed
bypassing the constitutional separation of powers and allowing for
joint state-Commonwealth arrangements concerning offshore re-
sources whether inside or outside territorial limits.' 28  Administra-
tion of offshore activity was by the states under Commonwealth
supervision, and royalties were equally divided between the ad-
jacent state and the Commonwealth.
129
In Australia, as in Canada, offshore exploration was of little
import until the early 1960's. In 1960, a corporation acquired
offshore permits from the governments of Tasmania, Victoria and
South Australia, triggering an offshore jurisdiction controversy. In
June, 1962, the first of several conferences was held between the
State Ministers for Mines and the Commonwealth Minister for
National Development to discuss offshore rights. 130  Interest in
offshore oil and gas exploration had peaked by the April 17, 1964
meeting of the Commonwealth Minister for National Development
and the State Ministers for Mines.
131
In Canada, the provinces had hoped to avoid litigation of the
offshore questions, but the central government had resolved other-
wise. In Australia, however, both the states and Commonwealth
were eager to avoid litigation,3 2 and an agreement was executed
by the State constantly subject to invalidation as erosion takes its toll on
the land along the shore.
Texas Boundary Case, 394 U.S. 1, 9 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting,.
128. Head, supra note 54, at 312-13.
129. Id. at 313.
130. Beauchamp, supra note 98, at 452. Compare developments in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany:
The question of the continental shelf has assumed added importance
in Germany since the discovery of natural gas basins near the Nether-
lands coast and of oil at the mouth of the Ems River. As in Australia,
the Lander took the initiative; starting in 1963, four coastal Lander,
represented by a joint Authority, the Mines Office of Clausthal-Zellers-
feld, have granted a concession to a German consortium, which includes
at least four firms controlled by foreign interests, to prospect for and
then exploit the resources of their continental shelf. However, they
gave that concession only insofar as they are "empowered so to do by
domestic law" as well as by international law; the International Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf came into force in June 1964 but the fed-
eral authorities have not yet recognized, at least in theory, the validity
of the concession granted by the Mines Office. Instead the federal gov-
ernment hastened to proclaim for itself, immediately after the coming
into operation of the Convention, its "sovereign and exclusive right" to
the German shelf, forbidding prospecting or development undertaken
without its authority.
J. BROssARD, LEs Pouvoms ExTERmurs Du QuEBEC 331 (1967) (translation by
Professor A. Abel, U. of Toronto).
131. Beauchamp, supra note 98, at 452-53.
132. Id. at 453.
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on October 16, 1967, by the six states and by the Common-
wealth. 188
The Agreement's foremost characteristics were that the parties
undertook to legislate in exactly the same terms as to all offshore
gas and oil operations, and that they would not unilaterally amend
the legislation thus enacted absent the concurrence of all the other
parties. 1 4  The Australian territorial seabed and continental shelf
was divided into "Adjacent Areas", one to each state and coastal
territory. Commonwealth legislation pertained to all such areas,
but each state's legislation applied solely to its own Adjacent
Area.1
35
The Adjacent Areas' seaward boundaries as defined in the
second schedule to the principal Commonwealth Act were subject
to the overriding provision that the Adjacent Areas encompassed
only territorial waters and areas of superadjacent waters of the con-
tinental shelf."8 6 Hence, internal waters as defined under interna-
tional law were excluded, and the seaward limits of the Adjacent
Areas were determined via the definition under international law
of the limits of national jurisdiction over the continental shelf, to
the degree that such limits fall within the second schedule bound-
aries. These latter limits were drawn far offshore in light of the
ambulatory nature of the bounds of national jurisdiction defined
by the Continental Shelf Convention.'
A single petroleum law code was provided, administration of
the common code being by a "Designated Authority" for each
Adjacent Area.'38 Offshore oil and gas production revenues were
also to be shared by the states and Commonwealth under the
Agreement. The Commonwealth netted a four percent royalty on
all production, while all remaining royalties and monies went to the
state from the Adjacent Area in which the funds were raised.
18 9
133. Agreement relating to the Exploration for, and the Exploitation of, the
Petroleum Resources, and certain other Resources, of the Continental Shelf of
Australia and of certain Territories of the Commonwealth and of other Submerged
Land.
134. Beauchamp, supra note 98, at 453.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 453-54.
137. id. at 454.
138. The Designated Authority in the case of a state was the State Minister
for Mines; he served as administrator for both the Commonwealth and his state.
139. Id. at 454-55.
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The Agreement's preamble included the declaration that the
state and Commonwealth governments were not derogating from
their respective constitutional powers. 140 "The concept underlying
the Agreement and the uniform legislation enacted pursuant there-
to is one of cooperation, not by division of areas or nature of
regime, but by concurrent action to establish a single administra-
tive regime."141
Through this means, the states and Commonwealth might
potentially avoid such problems as might ultimately arise from
a determination by the High Court of Australia either that the
state boundaries lie at low-water mark or that they lie at the
Australian national three-mile limit. This question had remained
undecided after the High Court's opinion in Bonser v. La
Macchia,'42 holding that the Commonwealth's "Austrajian waters"
means more than "territorial waters.'
4 3
Admittedly, some criticism of this method has been elicited. A
1971 report of a Select Committee of the Australian Senate averred
that despite the advantages to the national interest which the
Agreement had produced, the larger national interest was not
served in leaving unresolved the extent of Commonwealth and state
authority in the territorial seabed and continental shelf.
44
V. THE IMPERATIVE FOR MARGINAL SEA CERTAINTY
There undoubtedly are pressing practical imperatives toward
the promptest possible resolution of Canada's federal-provincial
offshore claims. The federal government issues permits for deep
water drilling for petroleum off the Canadian coasts. 145  The
coastal provinces have demanded that drilling companies seek
provincial permission as well.' 46 For that reason, some companies
attempt to protect themselves by acquiring both provincial and
federal permits.14 7 Complications inevitably developed as the two
140. Id. at 455.
141. Id. at 456. The authors continue: "In this respect it is the opposite
approach to that adopted so far in the United States and Canada." Id.
142. 43 A.L.J.R. 275 (1969).
143. See O'Connell, The Commonwealth Fisheries Power and Bonser v. La
Macchia, 3 ADELAmE L. REv. 500, 501 (1970).
144. Beauchamp, supra note 98, at 455.
145. The Legal Clamor, supra note 105, at 313.
146. Id. at 313-14.
147. ld. at 314.
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governmental levels issued inconsistent permits. 148  Companies
applying for both provincial and federal permits paid the fees
required by each government,' 49 and "[t]he result of these con-
flicting claims was not chaos, but it was expensive."'150 Overlap-
ping permits simply constitute one of many practical difficulties. 151
The great financial significance of American offshore re-
sources exploitation has been invoked explicitly in urging prompt
settlement of Canadian differences.15 2  And this is little wonder.
As the U.S. Supreme Court reminded during 1975 concerning the
Submerged Lands Act and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act:
Since 1953, when this legislation was enacted, 33 lease sales
have been held, in which 1,940 leases, embracing over eight
million acres, have been issued. The Outer Continental
Shelf, since 1953, has yielded over three billion barrels of oil,
19 trillion m.c.f. of natural gas, 13 million long tons of sulfur,
and over four million long tons of salt. In 1973 alone,
1,081,000 barrels of oil and 8.9 billion cubic feet of natural
gas were extracted daily from the Outer Continental Shelf.
153
Other reasons exist to justify a speedy clarification of the
situation in Canada. Should potential offshore oil and gas re-
sources not be exploited within the near future, they may never be,
and alternate power sources, such as nuclear energy, may displace
them in the Canadian and global marketplaces. 5 4  In the short
run, rapid exploitation of offshore oil, especially in the Atlantic,
would help alleviate the Canadian balance of payments prob-
lems.1
55
VI. THE PRESSURES OF POLICY
The moment attached by the U.S. Supreme Court to policy
considerations while weighing the federal defense/foreign relations
capacity in the offshore seabed context arguably is practical, not
148. Id.
149. Head, supra note 54, at 134.
150. Id. See also Logan, supra note 98, at 203.
151. Legal Issues, supra note 86, at 484.
152. "To the money-starved federal and provincial governments, the financial
stakes are high. In the United States, revenues derived from offshore oil produc-
tion have amounted to billions of dollars." Logan, supra note 98, at 203.
153. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 527-28 (1975).
154. Logan, supra note 98, at 203.
155. Under Canada's national oil policy, her petroleum needs east of the Ot-
tawa Valley currently are met by imported oil. Id. at 203-04.
1976
24
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1976], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol6/iss2/4
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAw JOURNAL
only for the U.S., but also for Canada. As late as 1973, Canada
faced no less than six boundary questions with the nations of
France, Denmark, and the United States."5 6 Oil or potential oil
was a factor in at least two of these disputes.
In 1971, the Maine-Nova Scotia boundary was found to be
"one of the thorniest boundary questions at the moment because of
the high oil and gas potential."' 57 Canada had issued exploration
permits for the disputed area, the northeast part of Georges Bank
in the Gulf of Maine between Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, and
the United States publicly had presented industry with notice that it
recognized neither the validity of the Canadian permits nor the
Canadian claim to sovereignty in that portion of the continental
shelf. 158
The Canadian-French boundary around St. Pierre and Mi-
quelon was in recent years of "major concern."' 59  In 1967, an oil
exploration permit was issued by France which covered the islands
and adjacent waters. In 1968, France passed a law, specifically
including French territories overseas, which regulated and declared
sovereign rights in exploration for, and development of natural
resources on the continental shelf.' Canada retaliated by issuing
to Mobil Oil and Gulf Oil permits which overlapped with those of
the French.' By 1971, three different governments, Canada,
France and Newfoundland, had awarded overlapping rights to
different companies in the sea adjacent to the islands.162
Precisely how realistic a role Premier Moores' Newfoundland
can ever hope to play in a transnational oil dispute is open to
question. To be sure, of all the Canadian provinces, the Maritime
Provinces and Newfoundland enjoy the strongest historical basis
for sustaining territorial sea claims despite the British Columbia
156. Beauchamp, supra note 98, at 438.
157. Id. at 443.
158. Id. Canadian and American officials first met to discuss this regional
boundary question on December 15, 1975, in Ottawa. In spite of these negotia-
tions, the U.S. Interior Dept. on January 2, 1976, selected 206 offshore tracts in
this area for environmental impact review prior to a scheduled oil drilling lease
sale. This offended both Canadian and Massachusetts officials, with Canada ex-
pressing serious concern over the selection of tracts which are in a region claimed
by Canada. Chris. Sci. Monitor, Jan. 16, 1976, at 9, col. 1.
159. Logan, supra note 98, at 206.
160. Beauchamp, supra note 98, at 447.
161. Id.
162. Logan, supra note 98, at 206.
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decision. 1 8 Professor Ivan L. Head speculates that perhaps solely
"Newfoundland, by reason of its brief attainment of independent
status in the 1930's, may be able to establish a clearly singular
constitutional, and therefore territorial history." 164 As to the con-
tinental shelf, Newfoundland (even more than Nova Scotia or New
Brunswick) might have some historically workable claim.'65 Prior
to Newfoundland's 1949 entry into the Confederation, 6" consider-
able state practice supported the doctrine of the continental
shelf.' 67  On the other hand, in 1951, Lord Asquith found in the
Abu Dhabi Arbitration'68 that under international law the conti-
nental shelf doctrine was not yet accepted.' 69
Even were Newfoundland to eventually provide the Supreme
Court of Canada with an otherwise convincing case for territorial
sea and continental shelf claims, the policy considerations invoked
by the United States Supreme Court in Maine and in the Tidelands
Cases arguably ought to make the Court in Ottawa give the prob-
lem a closer scrutiny. Were Newfoundland free to dispose of her
offshore seabeds substantially as she desired while defended by
Canada, the resulting performance of Canada as international actor
might indeed be awkward. The potential for problems arising is
obvious.
VII. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion has examined the most significant
judicial decisions in Canada and the United States concerning the
jurisdictional status of marginal sea exploitation. The potential for
forthcoming jurisdictional clashes within Canada over marginal sea
exploitation was examined, and the prospect for a broadly accepta-
ble outcome of such clashes was touched upon through allusion to
163. I.AFoREsT, supra note 54, at 100-01. For a detailed discussion of these
historical arguments, see id. at 100-03.
164. Head, supra note 54, at 143.
165. L AFOREST, supra note 54, at 107-08.
166. Evoy, How the American Revolution Influenced Canada, 3 LEBERTARIN
OPTIoN 5 (1975).
167. LAFoREsT, supra note 54, at 107.
168. In the Matter of an Arbitration between Petroleum Development (Tru-
cial Coast) Ltd. and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi [reproduced in 1 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 247 (1952)].
169. See Head, supra note 54, at 148. A Newfoundland claim to the con-
tinental shelf would face other legal difficulties as well. See LAFOREST, supra
note 54, at 107.
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politico-legal strategies depended upon in Australia and the United
States. Finally, it was suggested that the danger of international
rivalries over marginal sea area exploitation arguably renders per-
suasive an energetic federal government role in the marginal sea
arena.
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